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Text of Remarks on Panel: "Indigenous
Peoples, Environmental Torts and
Cultural Genocide"
BY RICHARD HERZ*
In my comments on the panelists' excellent presentations, I
would like to return to an issue mentioned in this morning's session
on "Litigating the Alien Tort Claims Act." The issue is whether the
rights to be free from massive environmental degradation and
cultural genocide that have just been described by the panelists are
sufficiently established in international law to be actionable under the
Alien Tort Claims Act ("ATCA"). I believe they are.
First, I will talk about cultural rights. As Emily Yozell observed
in her presentation, many of the world's last great untapped stores of
natural resources are on indigenous peoples' lands. And as Martin
Wagner's description of the plight facing the U'wa vividly illustrates,
extracting those resources will, in at least some instances, devastate
the local peoples' cultures. Therefore, cultural rights is an important
topic for those concerned with multinational corporate responsibility.
The primary hurdle in seeking to apply the international norms
protecting cultural rights under the ATCA is Beanal v. Freeport
McMoRan. There, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana rejected a cultural genocide claim because it found the
Genocide Convention does not prohibit the destruction of a culture.1
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that
a cultural genocide claim was not actionable under the ATCA
* Litigation Director, EarthRights International. Mr. Herz serves as co-counsel
for the plaintiffs in several Alien Tort Claims Act suits against multinational
corporations, including Doe I v. Unocal Corp.; Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum
Corp.; Bano v. Union Carbide Corp. and Bowoto v. Chevron Corp. The
environmental and cultural rights arguments stated herein are presented in
substantially more detail in Richard L. Herz, LitigatingEnvironmentalAbuses Under
the Alien Tort ClaimsAct: A PracticalAssessment, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 545 (2000).
1. 969 F. Supp. 362,373 (E.D. La. 1997).
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because cultural rights are neither sufficiently specific nor universally
accepted.2 Both courts' decisions were wrong.
The district court was simply confused about the terminology. It
assumed that the plaintiffs' cultural genocide claim was actually a
genocide claim. As a result, it evaluated the claim under the
Genocide Convention, and dismissed the claim based on its
conclusion that the Convention requires the physical destruction of a
people.
A cultural genocide claim, however is completely distinct from a
genocide claim. A brief review of the legal history of cultural rights
proves the point. The international community enacted the Genocide
Convention after World War II as part of its response to the
Holocaust.
The Convention's drafters debated whether the
Convention should ban only genocide as currently defined, or
whether it should also prohibit acts "committed with the intent to
destroy the language, religion or culture of a national, racial or
religious group .

.

. ."

There was, however, no question that the

destruction of a culture violated international law. The issue was
solely whether to include cultural genocide in the Genocide
Convention, or to address it in later conventions. They eventually
decided to wait.
The international community fulfilled its promise to protect
cultural rights in the major international human rights treaties drafted
subsequent to the Genocide Convention.! All of these treaties
recognize a right to one's own culture. Given this, the Fifth Circuit
was mistaken in asserting that cultural rights have not achieved
universal acceptance. This is particularly so since cultural genocide is
simply a particularly egregious type of racial, religious or ethnic
discrimination, and state-sponsored discrimination on these grounds
is without question barred under international law.
The Fifth Circuit also erred in concluding that it is impossible to
determine what conduct constitutes a violation of the right to culture.
The post-Convention treaties protecting cultural rights offer far
broader protections than the provision considered for inclusion in the
2. 197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999).
3. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, 5 April to May 10, 1948, U.N.
ESCOR, 7th Sess., Supp. No. 6, art. III., at 6, U.N. Doe. E1794 (1948).
4. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for
signatureDec. 16, 1966, S. EXEC. Doc. E, 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171; International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16,
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
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Genocide Convention. Accordingly, acts that meet that definition are
clearly forbidden by international law.
Now I want to turn to the topic of environmental claims under
the Alien Tort Claims Act. As Martin Wagner stated in his
presentation, international law recognizes a human right to a
minimally adequate environment. The Fifth Circuit in Beanal,
however, rejected an ATCA claim based upon that right, and I would
like to briefly explain why I think the court was mistaken.
As it did with respect to cultural rights, Beanal held that the
plaintiff failed to show that an environmental right is universally
recognized, and that it has articulable standards. The Court,
however, relied only on a limited number of sources, namely an
international environmental law textbook and the Rio Declaration.
Beanal ignores the fact that, beginning in 1972 with the Stockholm
Declaration, nations have repeatedly and universally recognized that
individuals have a right to an environment adequate for survival.
Moreover, Beanal contains no analysis of the "some 350 multilateral
treaties, 1,000 bilateral treaties and [the] multitude of instruments of
intergovernmental organizations," that a U.N. Special Rapporteur
correctly concluded establishes the right to a minimally healthy
environment under customary international law.5
That right is definable. Even during war, international law bans
acts that "may be expected to cause [widespread, long-term and
severe damage] to the natural environment and thereby to prejudice
the health or survival of the population."6 Since wartime rights are
international minimums, international law prohibits at least those
actions that may be expected to cause these same types of harms in
peacetime.
Despite the fact that the Rio Declaration specifically recognizes
the right to a healthy environment,7 Beanal suggested the Declaration
cut against the plaintiff's claim, because the Declaration also states

5. Human Rights and the Environment: Final Report Prepared by Mrs. Fatma
Zohra Ksentini, Special Rapporteur,U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Human Rights, 46th

Sess., at 8 & Annex I, princ. 2, at 75, U.N. Doe. EICN.4/Sub.2/1994/9 (1994).
6. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and

Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I),
adopted June 8, 1977, art. 55(1), 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 28, reprintedin 16 I.L.M. 1391, 1415.

7. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, June 14, 1992, princ. 1,
in Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development,
Annex I, at 8, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I) (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874,

876 (1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration].
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that nations have sovereignty over their natural resources.' The
Court was mistaken, precisely because the right to a minimum level of
environmental protection adequate for survival is a fundamental
human right. State sovereignty is not a defense to a violation of an
international human right. Rather, such rights limit state sovereignty.
For example, how a nation administers its criminal justice system is
clearly within its sovereignty. But no one seriously disputes the fact
that states must obey certain limits, such as not summarily executing
arrestees. By the same token, nations may choose how to use their
natural resources. But they cannot use them in a way that violates the
basic human rights to subsistence and survival.
The recognition that a minimally adequate environment is a
fundamental human right also refutes Beanal's suggestion that
international law prohibits only transboundary environmental harm.
Human rights norms usually apply to abuses that take place within a
single country. Thus, it makes no difference whether the harm
crosses international boundaries. In any event, when the defendant is
a multinational corporation, the harm usually is transboundary, as the
challenged actions were typically planned and initiated from outside
the country in which the harms occurred.
Beanal is a set-back for those who believe multinational
corporations should not be permitted to inflict massive harms in
developing nations with impunity. The case, however, is unlikely to
be the last word on cultural and environmental rights. In fact, four
other ATCA suits involving environmental claims are currently
making their way through the courts, in jurisdictions outside the Fifth
Circuit. Obviously, we cannot assess the ultimate impact of Beanal
until those cases are resolved.

8. Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d. 161, 167 n.6 (5th Cir. 1999)
(citing Rio Declaration, supra note 7, princ. 2).

